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Abstract
We analyze the dynamics of a game of sequential bidding in the presence
of stochastic scale eects in the form of stochastic economies or disec-
onomies of scale. We show that economies give rise to declining expected
equilibrium prices, whereas the converse is not generally true. Moreover,
rst and secondprice auctions are not always revenue equivalent. In-
deed, economies of scale make the secondprice format more protable
for the seller, whereas revenue equivalence holds in the case of disec-
onomies.
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1 Introduction
Many auction settings are characterized by examples along the following
lines:
 An art collector or specialized art dealer participates in auctions for
expressionistic paintings from the early 1920’s. As the collection
grows, the missing pictures become more valuable, because the
collection as a whole is more valuable than the sum of its parts.
 A contract to develop and supply a new generation ghter jet is
auctioned recurrently. Experience gives a competitive advantage.
Therefore, winning several auctions is more valuable than the sum
of winning each auction alone.
 A license to supply catering services in a university cafeteria is
awarded in a recurring auction. Success breeds failure. As the li-
censee becomes more established, organizational slack builds up.
The essential characteristic of these examples is that several units
or licenses are auctioned recurrently, after some lapse of time, and that
bidders’ valuations are stochastically dependent across auctions.
Recurring auctions are widespread. The private rms or governments
that procure certain goods or contracts, typically continue buying at cer-
tain regular time intervals. And the art dealer or collector who acquired
a portfolio of items is typically a regular participant at related auctions.
Also, in recurring auctions, valuations are typically stochastically depen-
dent, due to learning, complementarities, or wearout and organizational
slack.
The present paper analyzes recurring auctions with stochastically de-
pendent valuations in a simple framework where two prizes are auc-
tioned in sequence to two bidders. Prior to each auction, bidders draw
their private valuations for the item on the trading block. At the begin-
ning, when the rst prize is auctioned, random valuations are symmetric
and independent. However, in the second auction, the probability dis-
tributions of valuations depends upon the history of either winning or
losing the rst auction.
Specically, we consider two scenarios: stochastic economies and dis-
economies of scale. Stochastic economies of scale occur if the winner of
the rst prize has a higher random valuation for the second prize, due to
complementarities or learning eects. And diseconomies occur if the
winner’s random valuation declines, for example due to organizational
slack in the framework of licensing and procurement.
We analyze the equilibrium solution of rst and secondprice auc-
tions, provide necessary and sucient conditions for declining and in-
creasing equilibrium prices, and for the revenue ranking of rst vs.
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secondprice auction formats. In particular, we show that stochastic
economies of scale give rise to declining expected prices, whereas the
converse is not generally true. Standard auction formats are not revenue
equivalent; economies of scale make the secondprice format more prof-
itable for the seller, whereas diseconomies preserve revenue equivalence.
Nevertheless, both auction formats are ecient.
There is a sizeable literature on sequential auctions, which, however,
focuses on the price sequence in the course of a multiunit auction. This
literature was stimulated by the observation of declining prices in wine
auctions of identical bottles of wine (Ashenfelter (1989)), and in real es-
tate auctions for identical condominium units (Ashenfelter and Genovese
(1992)). Similar evidence for declining prices was collected for commer-
cial real estate auctions, transponder leases, and stamp auctions,1 which
gave rise to the notion of a declining price anomaly.
Several explanationswere proposed to account for this alleged anomaly.
Black and de Meza (1992) show that declining prices may occur if bidders
demand several units and have the option to purchase several goods.
McAfee and Vincent (1993) explore the role of risk aversion as an ex-
planation of declining prices for identical items. Bernhardt and Scoones
(1994) and EngelbrechtWiggans (1994) show by example that prices de-
cline if items are stochastically equivalent and each bidder demands at
most one unit. In von der Fehr (1994) declining prices are a result of
reduced competition in the second auction, due to costly participation.
Gale and Hausch (1994) analyze auctions of stochastically equivalent
items in which winners have the right to chose among the items. And
Milgrom and Weber (1982) suggest that declining prices may be due to
the use of agents who are instructed to win an item at any price up to a
specied limit and who thus engage in nonstrategic bidding.
The present paper deviates from this literature in several regards:
First of all, we are not concerned with identical objects that are auc-
tioned immediately one after another. And therefore the motivation of
our analysis is not to add another explanation of the declining price se-
quence observed in these auctions. Instead, we are interested in under-
standing the dynamics of recurring auctions, when there is a suciently
long lapse of time between subsequent rounds of auctions, and bidders
do not yet know the value of the second item when they bid for the rst
item. Second, we consider situations where a bidder is interested in win-
ning all auctions, unlike the more usual unitdemand assumption. And
third, we are interested in modeling situations where bidders’ demand is
either stochastically increasing or decreasing, due to complementarities,
1Also, Beggs and Grady (1997) show declining prices relative to presale estimates in
art auctions during the 1980s.
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learning, or wear out and organizational slack.2
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we state the model.
In Section 3 we solve the model for the case of stochastic economies and
diseconomies of scale. Then, we analyze the distributions of equilibrium
bids and show when and why equilibrium prices decline or increase (Sec-
tion 4). Section 5 contains a revenue ranking of rst vs. secondprice
auctions for both scale assumptions. The paper closes with a discussion
in Section 6.
2 The Model
Consider a sequence of two auctions, either rst or secondprice, in each
of which a single prize is sold to two bidders. Prior to the rst auction
each bidder privately observes his valuation for the rst prize, V , but
not for the second. After conclusion of the rst auction, the winner is
announced and, after some lapse of time, bidders privately observe their
valuation for the second prize, VH . Due to scale eects, the random
variable VH depends upon the history H of winning or losing the rst
auction.
The valuations of the rst prize V are independent random variables
drawn from a support normalized to f0, vg, v > 0, with 0 < ρ : PrfV 
vg < 1.
The valuation of the second prize VH , depends on the bidders’ histo-
ries. We refer to the winner of the rst auction as incumbent, whose
valuation is VI , and the loser as the contestant, whose valuation is
VC . These valuations are stochastically independent and drawn from the
same support f0, vg, but the probability of the event VH  v, (H 2 fI, Cg)
is not the same for incumbent and contestant.
Stochastic economies of scale occur if the incumbent has a higher
probability, σ , of drawing the high valuation, i.e., 0 < σ < ρ < 1; whereas
diseconomies occur if 0 < ρ < σ < 1. Of course, economies lead to an
increasing, and diseconomies to a decreasing expected value of the prize.
Bidders are risk neutral and maximize the sum of the payos from
each auction by placing any real-valued bid (no discounting). The payos
in the second auction are
UH(VH) : Prfwinningg(VH − P2), H 2 fI, Cg, (1)
where P2 denotes the price paid in that auction. The overall payo, eval-
2von der Fehr and Riis (1998) study a somewhat similar environment; however, they
focus on dierent issues.
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uated at the time of the rst auction, is
U(V) :Prfwinningg(V − P1) PrfwinninggE[UI(VI)]
 (1− Prfwinningg)E[UC(VC)].
Letting  denote the (ex ante) value of incumbency
 : E[UI(VI)]− E[UC(VC)], (2)
the overall payo U can be written in the convenient form
U(V) : Prfwinningg (V − P1 ) E[UC(VC)]. (3)
Ties are broken in the rst auction by the ip of a fair coin, whereas,
for convenience, the incumbent is favored in the case of economies and
the contestant in the case of diseconomies.
The use of a discrete distribution ensures existence of a closed form
solution of the asymmetric second auction in the rstprice auction for-
mat. A discrete distribution entails that the equilibrium is in mixed
strategies. This may be viewed as undesirable, however, the equilibrium
in mixed strategies has all the desirable properties, such as monotonicity
(a bidder with a higher valuation bids higher). Therefore, the use of a dis-
crete distribution and the associated mixed strategy equilibrium should
be viewed as a matter of technical convenience. Some of the technical
diculties of solving asymmetric auctions if valuations are continuous
random variables are examined in Maskin and Riley (1994), (1996) and
Lebrun (1996).
3 Equilibrium Strategies
In this section we solve the equilibrium strategies for both auction for-
mats and both scale assumptions. We analyze the case of economies of
scale in detail, and then sketch how results change for the diseconomies
case.
3.1 Dutch (FirstPrice) Auctions
Since the model is solved by backward induction, rst consider the sec-
ond auction. Suppose there are stochastic economies of scale. Then the
winner of the rst auction has a higher likelihood of drawing a high val-
uation for the second prize. Consequently, the second auction is asym-
metric. The (unique) equilibrium strategies for this auction are:
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Proposition 1 (Second Auction) Suppose σ > ρ (economies). In equi-
librium bidders with valuation VH  0 bid their value and bidders with
VH  v play mixed strategies FH : [0, ρv]! [0,1]. Specically,
bH(0)  0, H 2 fI, Cg (bidder with V  0) (4)
FI(b)  1− ρv − bσ(v − b) (incumbent with V  v) (5)
FC(b)  (1− ρ)bρ(v − b) (contestant with V  v). (6)
Bidders’ equilibrium payos are
UH(0)  0, UH(v)  (1− ρ)v, H 2 fI, Cg. (7)
Proof If the rival plays the candidate equilibrium strategy, bidding be-
low 0 is not an improvement, since it results in losing the auction. Also,
bidders with valuation VH  0 will not bid above their own value of 0.
Next consider a bidder with valuation VH  v . If he bids b  0, while the
rival plays the strategies FH, bH(0), his payo is
UI(v)  (v − b)[(1− ρ) ρFC(b)]
UC(v)  (v − b)[(1− σ) σFI(b)].
Substituting the above strategies and applying the tiebreaking rule, one
obtains
UH(v) 


(v − b) if b > ρv,
(1− ρ)v if b 2 (0, ρv],
(1− ρ)v if b  0and H  I,
1
2(1− ρ)v if b  0and H  C.
Evidently, (1−ρ)v is the highest payo that can be achieved. Therefore
the best reply set of the incumbent with VI  v consists of all (mixed)
strategies on [0, ρv]. Similarly, the best replies of the contestant with
VC  v are all (mixed) strategies on (0, ρv]. Hence, the candidate strate-
gies are mutual best replies, as asserted. 
Given the equilibrium payos in the second auction, it is now possible
to determine the equilibrium value of incumbency, denoted by D. Since
bidders with value VH  0 have expected payos of 0 in the second auc-
tion, incumbency is valuable due to the positive payo (1−ρ)v obtained
if VH  v . Since σ > ρ, the incumbent is more likely to have valuation v
for the second prize than the contestant. Thus, after conclusion of the
rst auction, but before valuations of the second prize are drawn, the in-
cumbent has a second auction expected payo of σUI(v)  σ(1− ρ)v ,
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whereas the contestant’s expected second auction is ρUC(v)  ρ(1−ρ)v .
Hence, by denition (2),
D  (σ − ρ)(1− ρ)v. (8)
The value of incumbency aects bidders’ strategies in the rst auc-
tion. Specically, bidders account for the fact that winning the rst auc-
tion not only awards the rst prize, but also aects the future expected
payo. The following proposition summarizes how these considerations
aect bidding in the rst auction.
Proposition 2 (First Auction) Suppose σ > ρ (economies). In equilib-
rium bidders with valuation V  0 bid the value of incumbency, bidders
with V  v play a mixed strategy F : [D,ρv  D] ! [0,1], and both
continue in the second auction as summarized in Proposition 1. Speci-
cally,
b(0)  D (9)
F(b)  (1− ρ)(b −D)
ρ(v − b D) . (10)
Proof Consider rst a bidder with valuation V  0 who places the bid
b in the rst auction and continues with the strategies summarized in
Proposition 1. If his rival plays the candidate strategies, then using equa-
tion (3), his (overall) payo is
U 

(−b D)F(b) E[UC(VC)] if b > D,E[UC(VC)] if b  D.
Evidently, E[UC(VC)] is the highest payo that he can achieve, and there-
fore, b(0)  D is a best reply, as asserted.
Next, suppose the bidder has valuation V  v , and places the bid b
while his rival uses the candidate strategies. Then, using equation (3),
his overall payo is
U 


(−b D  ρv) (1− ρ2)v if b > ρv D,
(1− ρ2)v if b 2 (D,ρv D],
(1ρ2 − ρ2)v if b  D,
(ρ − ρ2)v if b < D.
Evidently, (1 − ρ2)v is the highest payo he can achieve, and the best
reply set is the set of all (mixed) strategies on (D,ρv D]. Therefore,
the candidate equilibrium strategies are mutual best replies, as asserted.

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Thus, compared to a static auction, the strategies of bidders with
value V  0, and the support of strategies of bidders with value V  v
are shifted by the value of incumbency, D. In other words, in the rst
auction, bidders not only compete for the rst prize, but also for the
position of incumbency in the second auction. In the case of economies,
incumbency is valuable (D > 0). Therefore bids are higher in the rst
auction than they would be if there were no second auction. Neverthe-
less, since all bids are shifted by the same amount, the auction remains
ecient.
Consider now the case of diseconomies (σ < ρ). The second auction
is nearly identical to that in the case of economies. Indeed, the strategies
and payos are as in Proposition 1, except that σ and ρ, as well as I
and C , exchange places. Thus, bidders with valuation VH  0 bid 0, and
bidders with VH  v play the mixed strategies FH : [0, σv] ! [0,1] and
have expected payos UH :
FI(b)  (1− σ)bσ(v − b), (5’)
FC(b)  1− σv − bρ(v − b), (6’)
UH(0)  0, UH(v)  (1− σ)v, H 2 fI, Cg. (7’)
The equilibrium strategies in the rst auction are given by equation (10);
however, the value of incumbency for the case of diseconomies is
D  (σ − ρ)(1− σ)v. (8’)
The asymmetric second auction gives rise to some corollaries con-
cerning the equilibrium distribution of bids.
Corollary 1 In the case of economies, an incumbent with VI  v bids
less aggressively than a contestant with VC  v , in the strong sense of
rstorder stochastic dominance:
FC(b) < FI(b), 8b 2 [0, ρv).
Proof By (5) and (6), combined with the assumed σ > ρ, one has, 8b 2
[0, ρv),
FI(b)  v(σ − ρ) b(1− σ)σ(v − b)
>
b(1− σ)
σ(v − b)
 b(1− ρ)
ρ(v − b)  FC(b),
as asserted. 
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Of course, having valuation VH  v always leads to higher bidding
than VH  0. Therefore, the less aggressive bidding by the incumbent
with valuation VI  v is oset by the higher probability with which the
incumbent draws that valuation. Interestingly, it turns out that the prob-
ability distributions of bids placed by incumbent and contestant, denoted
by GI(b),GC(b), are identical and the same as in a symmetric game in
which VH  v is drawn with probability ρ.
The analogue to Corollary 1 exists, yet in the case of diseconomies
it is the contestant with valuation VC  v , instead of the incumbent
with valuation VI  v , who bids less aggressively. Thus, the following
corollary applies to both scale assumptions.
Corollary 2 The equilibrium probability distributions of bids placed by
the incumbent and the contestant, GI,GC : [0,minfσ,ρgv] ! [0,1], are
the same,
GI(b)  [(1− σ) σFI(b)]  (1−minfσ,ρg)vv − b
GC(b)  [(1− ρ) ρFC(b)]  (1−minfσ,ρg)vv − b .
Moreover, GI and GC coincide with the distribution of bids that occur in a
symmetric game with PrfVH  vg minfσ,ρg.
Proof Substituting (5) and (6), and (5’) and (6’) into the above equations
yields the desired results. 
3.2 English (SecondPrice) Auctions
Now consider the alternative English auction format. The following propo-
sition gives the equilibrium strategies for both the rst and the second
auction. The strategies apply to both economies and diseconomies.
Proposition 3 (English Auctions) The English auction has an equilib-
rium in weakly dominant pure strategies
b1(V)  V E (rst auction) (11)
b2(VH)  VH, H 2 fI, Cg (second auction) (12)
E  (σ − ρ)v. (13)
Proof As is well known, in an English auction truthful bidding is an
equilibrium in (weakly) dominant strategies. This implies (11) and (12),
keeping in mind that the value of winning the rst auction is the value
of the rst prize plus the value of incumbency E .
Next, compute E . In the second auction a bidder’s payo is equal
to zero unless two conditions are met: the bidder has valuation VH  v ,
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and his rival’s valuation is VH  0. If these requirements are met, one
has UI(v)  ρv,UC(0)  0, resp. UC(v)  σv,UI(0)  0. Therefore, the
equilibrium value of incumbency is E  (σ − ρ)v. 
Notice that in the second round of the English auction equilibrium
strategies are independent of σ and ρ, unlike in the Dutch auction. This
plays a key role in the price formation and the revenue ranking of the
English vs. Dutch auction format.
4 Equilibrium Price Sequence
In the course of the two auctions the expected value of the auction prize
increases when there are economies of scale and decreases when there
are diseconomies. In the previous section we showed how this dynamics
aects bidding. Now we examine how it aects the probability distribu-
tions of equilibrium prices. Whereby declining and increasing prices are
characterized either in the strong sense of rstorder stochastic domi-
nance, or in the weaker sense of dierences in expected prices.
4.1 Dutch (FirstPrice) Auctions
Let W1(p),W2(p) denote the probability distribution of the winning bid,
that is the equilibrium price, in the rst and second auction, respectively;
and dene E[P1], E[P2] to be the associated expected prices.
Theorem 1 (Economies) Suppose σ > ρ. The random equilibrium price
declines from rst to second auction in the strong sense of rstorder
stochastic dominance,
W1(p)  W2(p), 8p,
with strict inequality almost everywhere.
Proof >From Corollary 2 and Proposition 1 and the fact that D > 0
one has
W2(p)  GI(p)GC(p)

(
(1− ρ)v
v − p
)2
>
(
(1− ρ)v
v − p D
)2
 [(1− ρ) ρF(p)]2  W1(p)
for all p from the interior of the supports of W1 and W2. 
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Although the average valuation increases from the rst to the second
auction, the Theorem demonstrates that the second prize is sold at a
lower price than the rst. The reason for this is that in the rst auction
the competition is not just for the rst prize, but also for the position
of incumbency in the second auction. The latter eect increases compe-
tition in the rst auction so that prices decline in the course of the two
auctions.
As prices decline in the case of economies, one might conjecture that
diseconomies should give rise to increasing equilibrium prices. After all,
diseconomiesmake incumbency undesirable, which lowers bidding in the
rst auction.
Surprisingly, this conjecture is not generally correct. Indeed, equilib-
rium prices decline also in the case of diseconomies, unless the incum-
bent’s probability of drawing a high valuation (σ ) is small compared to
the initial probability ρ. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 1, prices decline
for all combinations of σ and ρ except those in the shaded area.
-
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Figure 1: Declining and Increasing Prices
Theorem 2 (Diseconomies) Suppose σ < ρ. Then, expected equilibrium
prices decline if σ > 1−ρ2 , and increase if σ <
1−ρ
2 ,
E[PD1 ] ë E[P
D
2 ] () σ ë
1− ρ
2
.
Proof Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 for the case of diseconomies,
W2(p) 
(
(1− σ)v
v − p
)2
, p 2 [0, σv]
W1(p) 
(
(1− ρ)v
v − p D
)2
, p 2 [D,ρv D].
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Hence, using (8’) and dening φ(σ) : E[PD1 ]− E[PD2 ], one obtains3
E[PD2 ]  σ2v (14)
E[PD1 ]  ρ2v D 
(
ρ2  (σ − ρ)(1− σ)
)
v (15)
φ(σ)  (σ − ρ)(1− ρ − 2σ)v.
Since σ < ρ,φ(σ) ë 0 i 2σ ë 1− ρ. 
Another dierence is that in the case of diseconomies one cannot
rank the random equilibrium prices by rstorder stochastic dominance,
which is why Theorem 2 refers only to expected prices. This follows from
the fact that the distribution functionW2(p) is belowW1(p) for all p < 0,
but algebraic manipulation reveals a jump aboveW1(p) at p  0. Clearly,
this violates rstorder stochastic dominance.
The reason for declining expected equilibrium prices for large σ is
the way in which σ aects the equilibrium prices in the two consecutive
auctions. Increasing ρ while leaving σ unchanged, E[PD2 ] remains the
same, whereas E[PD1 ] is aected in two ways: First, it leads to a higher
probability of bidders having valuation V  v for the rst prize, which
yields a marginal increase of E[PD1 ] by 2ρv . Second, it decreases the
value of incumbency, which leads to a marginal decrease of E[PD1 ] by (1−
σ)v . Clearly the greater σ is, the smaller the impact of the second eect
is, so that the rst eect dominates. This results in declining expected
equilibrium prices for suciently large σ .
4.2 English (SecondPrice) Auctions
Unlike the Dutch auction, the evolution of prices in the English auction
is unambiguously governed by the scale assumption, as summarized in
the following Theorem.
Theorem 3 In the English auction, the expected equilibriumprice decreases
if there are economies, and increases if there are diseconomies
E[PE1 ] ë E[P
E
2 ] () σ ë ρ.
Proof Recall from Proposition 3 that PE2 is equal to v i VI  VC  v ,
and equal to 0 otherwise; similarly, PE1 is equal to vE i both bidders
draw the valuation V  v and equal to E otherwise. Therefore,
E[PE1 ]  (1− ρ2)E  ρ2(v E)  ρ2v  (σ − ρ)v (16)
E[PE2 ]  ρσv, (17)
and the assertion follows immediately. 
3To compute E[PD1 ], note that W1(p) has a mass point at p  D .
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5 Revenue Ranking
Which auction formateither Dutch or Englishgives the seller the higher
expected revenue? While in the second auction the English auction is un-
ambiguously more protable to the seller, the revenue ranking in the rst
auction depends upon the scale assumption. Altogether, the rstround
weighs suciently strong to make the scale assumption pivotal for the
ranking of the seller’s overall expected revenue. As a rst step we con-
sider the ranking of expected revenues in each of the two auctions, and
then proceed to rank the seller’s overall expected revenues.
Proposition 4 (Second Auction Revenue) The seller’s equilibrium ex-
pected revenue in the second auction is higher in the English than in the
Dutch auction:
E[PD2 ] < E[P
E
2 ],
regardless of whether there are economies or diseconomies.
Proof Recall from (14), E[PD2 ]  σ2v if σ < ρ. Similarly, E[PD2 ]  ρ2v
if σ > ρ. Finally, from (17), E[PE2 ]  σρv . Hence,
E[PD2 ]  (minfσ,ρg)2 v < σρv  E[PE2 ],
as asserted. 
The key to understanding the superiority of the English auction in
the second round of bidding is Corollary 2. There it is shown that in the
Dutch auction the distribution of bids, and hence the seller’s expected
revenue, is the same as in a symmetric game in which both incumbent
and contestant draw the high valuation VH  v with the smaller probabil-
ity, PrfVH  vg  minfσ,ρg. Of course in a (static) symmetric auction,
Dutch and English formats yield the same expected revenues. However,
if either σ > ρ (economies) or σ < ρ (diseconomies), one of the bidders
has a higher chance of drawing VH  v , while strategies in the English
format are unaected by variations in σ or ρ (see (12)). Therefore, com-
pared to the symmetric English auction, one bidder’s average bid is higher
which raises the seller’s expected revenue. This explains why the English
auction is superior to the seller, for economies and diseconomies alike.
However, this unconditional superiority of the English auction does
not extend to the rst round of bidding.
Proposition 5 (First Auction Revenue) The seller’s equilibrium expected
revenue in the rst auction is higher in the Dutch auction if there are dis-
economies, and higher in the English auction if there are economies, i.e.,
E[PD1 ] ë E[P
E
1 ] () σ ê ρ.
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Proof In the case of diseconomies (σ < ρ), (15) and (16) yield
E[PD1 ] 
(
ρ2  (σ − ρ)(1− σ)
)
v
>
(
ρ2  (σ − ρ)
)
v  E[PE1 ].
Similarly, if σ > ρ, using W1 from the proof of Theorem 1 one has
E[PD1 ] 
(
ρ2  (σ − ρ)(1− ρ)
)
v
<
(
ρ2  (σ − ρ)
)
v  E[PE1 ].

To understand this result, note rst that the auctions are equivalent to
a static symmetric auction in which bidders draw either the valuation or
v. If the values of incumbency, , were the same, the seller’s expected
revenues would also be the same, by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem.
However, from equations (8), (8’), and (13) the values of incumbency dier
as follows
E ë D () σ ë ρ. (18)
Of course, the seller’s expected revenue is increased if bidders’ valuations
are uniformly increased. Hence, the auction with the higher  also yields
the higher expected revenue.
The reason for (18), is that in the second auction of the Dutch format
both the incumbent and the contestant benet from the asymmetry of
the auction (cf. Corollary 2), whereas in the English format it is only the
incumbent in the case of economies and the contestant in the case of
diseconomies. A straightforward implication of this is that the value of
incumbency is greater in absolute value in the English auction.
We now turn to the overall expected revenues for the two formats.
To this end, dene  : E[P1] E[P2] to be the seller’s overall expected
revenue.
Theorem 4 (Revenue Ranking) The seller’s overall equilibrium expected
revenue is higher in the English than in the Dutch format if and only if
there are economies, otherwise the auction formats are revenue equiva-
lent, i.e.,
E > D () σ > ρ,
E  D () σ  ρ.
Proof The superiority of the English auction in the caseσ > ρ (economies)
follows from the fact that the English auction gives rise to higher rev-
enues in both auctions, as shown in Propositions 4 and 5.
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In turn, if σ < ρ (diseconomies), one obtains:
D −E  (E[PD1 ]− E[PE1 ]) (E[PD2 ]− E[PE2 ])
 (σ − ρ)v[(1− σ)− 1] σ(σ − ρ)v
 0,
as asserted. 
6 Conclusion
Many, if not most, auctions are recurring events. Thus, bidders may
have reasonable expectations of meeting current opponents again at a
future auction, under terms that are aected by the outcome of previ-
ous auctions. In many such instances a bidder who has won a previous
auction may experience either an increase or a decrease of their random
valuation in subsequent auctions, due to complementarities, learning ef-
fects, or wearout and organizational slack. The theme of this paper is
to study how this dynamic structure aects bidders’ strategies, equilib-
rium prices, and equilibrium revenues in the two most common auction
formats.
It is shown that stochastic scale eects may intensify competition in
the rst auction, even if winning the rst auction is unfavorable due to
the presence of diseconomies of scale. In these instances this results in
declining prices. Moreover, rst and secondprice auctions are gener-
ally not revenue equivalent. Economies of scale make the secondprice
format more protable for the seller. However, revenue equivalence is
preserved in the case of diseconomies.
Although the model employs a highly stylized twostate distribution,
the main results and intuition extend to more general models. However,
the extension to more than two rounds of bidding poses intricate issues,
unless one assumes that stochastic scale eects occur only once and for
all. If repeated scale eects occur, the trade-os of winning and losing an
auction become fairly complex and the equilibrium price sequence may
fail to be monotone.
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